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Case Note
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—“Can You Hear Me Now?”:
Warrantless Cell Phone Searches and the Fourth Amendment;
People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011)
Joshua Eames *
Introduction
On April 25, 2007, Gregory Diaz was arrested for participating in the sale
of ecstasy.1 During questioning at the police station the arresting officer, without
a warrant and more than ninety minutes after the initial arrest, took Diaz’s cell
phone from the station’s evidence room and scrolled through the text message
folder.2 He discovered a message implicating Diaz in the sale, which led to Diaz
confessing.3 Both the trial and appellate courts denied Diaz’s motion to suppress
the cell phone evidence, holding the search of the cell phone was incident to
arrest and any evidence it turned up was “fair game.” 4 The California Supreme
Court affirmed on the same grounds, concluding that because the cell phone was
“immediately associated” with Diaz’s person, the search was valid.5
This kind of warrantless search is troubling given that a growing number of
Americans rely heavily on the use and availability of their personal cell phones.6
Within the last decade, the accessibility and proliferation of such devices has

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming College of Law, 2013. I would like to extend
my most sincere gratitude to all the Wyoming Law Review editors, and in particular Jared Miller and
Kyle Ridgeway for all the long hours and effort they spent helping edit this note. I would also like
to thank all my friends and classmates, in particular the Basement Kids, who provided an enormous
amount of support and encouragement throughout this entire process. Most importantly, I would
like to thank my fiancée, Melissa, for just being as awesome as she is and has been throughout this
process; May 25th, 2012 could not come soon enough!
1

People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 502 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011).

2

Id.

3

Id. at 502–03.

4

Id. at 503; infra note 78 (quoting the specific language of the trial court).

5

Diaz, 244 P.3d at 505–06 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).

Wireless substitution: Early release of estimates from the National Health Interview Survey,
January–June 2010, Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless201012.htm. During the first half of 2010, more than one in four
Americans (26.6%) relied solely on their personal cell phones for communication as opposed to a
landline, and 15.6% of households with a landline preferred to rely on their cell phones instead of
their landline. Id.
6
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grown tremendously.7 The technology that powers cell phones has improved to
the point where some are more analogous to personal computers, rather than
a device merely capable of making a phone call.8 Such phones are commonly
referred to as “smartphones.” 9 A smartphone can store a wealth of highly personal
information.10 However, it has become a common practice, such as in Diaz,
for the police to search an arrestee’s cell phone looking for evidence of criminal
activity.11 These searches create troubling concerns relating to a person’s privacy
and freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusion as guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment.12
This case note criticizes the holding in Diaz for three reasons. First, by
justifying the warrantless search of Diaz’s cell phone under the search incident
to arrest exception, the court paid little more than lip service to the rationales
underlying the exception, allowing the exception to (further) swallow both the
warrant and reasonableness clauses of the Fourth Amendment.13 Second, the
court was oblivious to the significant privacy interests implicated by cell phones
(specifically smartphones) having the ability to store immense amounts of
personal information. Instead, the court relied on United States Supreme Court
U.S. Wireless Quick Facts, Int’l Ass’n for the Wireless Telecomm. (CTIA), http://www.
ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/AID/10323 (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (indicating that in
December 2000 there were 109.5 million wireless service subscribers, or “connections,” in the
United States, or 38% of the United States population; but by December 2010 that number had
nearly tripled to 302.9 million “connections,” or 96% of the United States population).
7

8
See Smartphone Definition, PCMag.com, www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,
t=Smartphone&i=51537,00.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (explaining that smartphones have
the capabilities to “run myriad applications, turning the once single-minded cell phone into a
mobile computer”).

Id. (defining a smartphone as “[a] cellular telephone with built-in applications and Internet
access [and] provide[s] digital voice service as well as text messaging, e-mail, Web browsing, still and
video cameras, MP3 player, video viewing and often video calling”).
9

10
Cf. United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003–04 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d,
523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th
Cir. 2008).

[T]he information contained in a laptop and in electronic storage devices renders a
search of their contents substantially more intrusive than a search of the contents of a
lunchbox or other tangible object. A laptop and its storage devices have the potential
to contain vast amounts of information. People keep all types of personal information
on computers, including diaries, personal letters, medical information, photos and
financial records.
Id.
11

See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text; infra note 22 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 103–72 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 112–27 and accompanying text; see also Wayne A. Logan, An Exception
Swallows A Rule: Police Authority To Search Incident to Arrest, 19 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 381, 383
(2001) (noting “the search incident exception has evolved to swallow the rule, so much so that the
parameters and rationales originating the exception are now only vaguely recognizable in many
decisions of courts across the land”).
13
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cases handed down more than thirty years ago to justify its holding, the facts and
circumstances of which do not compare to the facts in Diaz.14 Third, the court
failed to consider laptops as a more accurate analogy to modern cell phones in the
context of warrantless searches.15 In ruling as they did, the Diaz court effectively
gave arresting officers great authority to rummage through an arrestee’s personal
information, regardless of whether that information is relevant to the crime
being investigated.

Background
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.16 The
operative word is “unreasonable.”17 The United States Supreme Court has declared
that searches without a warrant are “per se unreasonable.”18 However, searches
without judicial blessing can be found reasonable if they fall into a specifically
delineated exception.19

The Search Incident to Arrest Exception
One exception is search incident to arrest as recognized in its modern form
in Chimel v. California.20 The search incident to arrest exception is not the only
exception that allows police to search a person or place without a warrant, but “is
14

See infra notes 128–63 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes 164–72 and accompanying text.

16

U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Id.
17
See Bash v. Patrick, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1298 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (noting “[t]he most
operative word in the [Fourth] amendment is . . . ‘unreasonable’”).
18
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357–58 (1967). Additionally, Justice Harlan outlined
when the Fourth Amendment protections come into play. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
In order for a person to have a protectable privacy interest, there must be two questions asked
and answered in the affirmative. Id. First, “a person [must] have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy . . . .” Id. Second, “the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id.
19

Id. at 357–58.

395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969) (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)).
The Court explained the exception as follows:
20

What then is the present case? Before answering that inquiry specifically, it may be
well by a process of exclusion to state what it is not. It is not an assertion of the right
on the part of the Government, always recognized under English and American law,
to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the
fruits or evidences of crime.
Id.
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by far the most common variety of police search practice.” 21 Additionally, courts
that have addressed warrantless searches of an arrestee’s cell phone, including Diaz,
have overwhelmingly done so under the search incident to arrest exception.22
In Chimel, police procured an arrest warrant for Chimel in connection with
a burglary of a coin shop.23 After they arrived at Chimel’s home and made the
arrest, the officers disregarded Chimel’s protests and proceeded to “look around”
without a search warrant.24 The officers searched Chimel’s entire home, including
the master bedroom, attic, and garage.25 During their search, they found numerous
coins and other related objects, all of which the State introduced into evidence
despite Chimel’s objections.26 The California Supreme Court upheld the search,
determining it was constitutional as being “incident to a valid arrest.”27
After the United States Supreme Court recognized the search incident to
arrest exception as a valid exception to warrantless searches, the Court outlined
the justifications and scope of such a search:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that
the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered . . . .
In addition . . . the arresting officer [may] search for and seize
any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction . . . . There is ample justification . . .
for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his
immediate control’—construing that phrase to mean the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.28
21
3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search And Seizure: A Treatise On The Fourth Amendment § 5.2
(4th ed. 2004).
22
See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Lopez, 607 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007); Schlossberg v. Solesbee, No. 10-6014-TC, 2012 WL
141741 (D. Or. 2012); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2009); United
States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2009); United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336,
2008 WL 360548 (E.D. Wis. 2008); United States v. Santillan, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (D. Ariz.
2008); United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Smallwood
v. State, 61 So. 3d 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Fawdry v. State, 70 So. 3d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2011); Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E.2d 924 (Ga. 2012); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio
2009); State v. Carroll, 778 N.W. 2d 1 (Wis. 2010).
23

Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753.

24

Id. at 753–54.

25

Id. at 754.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 754–55.

28

Id. at 762–63 (emphasis added).
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Put simply, the Court justified warrantless searches incident to arrest in order
to: (1) protect police from weapons, and (2) preserve destructible evidence.29
Ultimately, the Court invalidated Chimel’s conviction, holding the search of
Chimel’s entire house unreasonable because it went far beyond his person and the
area within his immediate control.30

Personal Property Immediately Associated with the Arrestee’s Person
Soon thereafter, the Court expanded the search incident to arrest exception.31
In United States v. Robinson, police arrested Robinson for driving without a
license.32 The arresting officer conducted a pat down, during which he felt an
object in Robinson’s breast pocket.33 The officer removed the object and found it
to be a “crumpled up cigarette package,” but could not determine its contents.34
When he opened the package, the officer discovered fourteen heroin capsules.35
In upholding the search, the Court reasoned that after a lawful custodial
arrest, the police have the authority to fully search the arrestee’s body.36 Moreover,
the Court explained, police have such authority even without probable cause that
the arrestee possessed weapons or destructible evidence.37 More importantly, a
court may not later question whether an officer had reason to believe he or she
would have found either weapons or evidence on the arrestee.38

29

Id.

30

Id. at 768.

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). In his dissent, Justice Marshall noted
the search “[w]ent far beyond what was reasonably necessary to protect [officers] from harm or to
ensure [Robinson] would not effect an escape from custody . . . [and] it therefore fell outside the
scope of a properly drawn ‘search incident to arrest’ exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement.” Id. at 259 (Marshall, Douglas, & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
31

32

Id. at 220 (majority opinion).

33

Id. at 221–23.

Id. at 223. The officer testified at trial, “[a]s I felt the package I could feel objects in the
package, but couldn’t tell what they were . . . . I knew they weren’t cigarettes.” Id.
34

35

Id.

36

Id. at 235.

37

Id.

38

Id. The Court reasoned that:
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under
the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest
requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes
the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full
search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.

Id. (emphasis added).
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Thus, when police conduct a lawful custodial arrest and search the arrestee,
Robinson allows them to open and inspect containers they seize from the arrestee’s
person, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the item to be
inspected contains evidence indicative of illegal activity.39 This greatly expanded
the search incident to arrest exception because when police make a lawful arrest, a
search of the person is automatically reasonable as the arrest itself was a reasonable
intrusion on a person’s privacy interests.40 Most relevant to the subject of this note,
police may open and inspect any containers they find on the arrestee, regardless of
the probability of them containing either weapons or evidence.41

Personal Property Within the Arrestee’s Immediate Control
The Court later distinguished between searches of property immediately
associated with the person and searches of property within an arrestee’s immediate
control. In United States v. Chadwick, federal agents, unbeknown to the three
defendants, used a drug-sniffing dog to get a hit on the defendants’ footlocker
after it was unloaded from a train in which two of the defendants had been
traveling.42 After the dog “hit,” the agents waited for the defendants to place
the 200-pound footlocker into the back of Chadwick’s car.43 At that time, the
agents arrested all three and transported the defendants and the footlocker to the

Id. at 236; see also Adam R. Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can A Password Save Your
Cell Phone From A Search Incident To Arrest?, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 1125, 1132–33 (2011) (stating that
Robinson “permit[s] police officers to open and search through all items on an arrestee’s person,
even if they are in a closed container, and even without suspicion that the contents of the container
are illegal”).
39

40

See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.

Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236. In subsequent cases, the Court expanded on Robinson by
allowing the search of containers found in automobiles. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S.
615, 622–23 (2004) (allowing searches of an automobile’s passenger compartment even when
the arrestee was only “a recent occupant” of the automobile); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
460–61 (1981) (holding “that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant
of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile” and open and examine the contents of any container). However,
the Court took a step back five years later in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). In Gant, the
Court held that when an arrestee is in custody and cannot access his or her car to retrieve weapons
or evidence at the time of the search, “both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception
are absent and the rule does not apply.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 339.
41

433 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1977), rev’d on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565
(1991); see Commonwealth v. Pierre, 893 N.E.2d 378, 382 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008), aff ’d 902 N.E.2d
367 (Mass. 2009) (“Acevedo, although overruling Chadwick in part, affected only the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement and legality of searches of closed containers therein . . . . It
did not, therefore, alter the central tenet of Chadwick regarding search incident to arrest.”); United
States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (noting Acevedo
“overrul[ed] Chadwick as to containers within a vehicle . . . . Chadwick’s holding that a search
incident to arrest must not be too remote in time or place is still good law”).
42

43

Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 4.
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station.44 Approximately ninety minutes after the arrest, the agents, without a
search warrant, opened the footlocker and found a large quantity of marijuana.45
The Court rejected the argument that the search was valid as being incident
to arrest for two reasons.46 First, the footlocker was not immediately associated
with the arrestee’s person because it was in the trunk of Chadwick’s car at the time
of arrest.47 The fact that the footlocker was in the trunk of a car, rather than on the
arrestee’s person, distinguished Chadwick from Robinson.48 Second, the footlocker
had been reduced to the exclusive control of the police prior to the warrantless
search.49 Therefore, the Court reasoned there was “no longer any danger that the
arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence.” 50
Furthermore, because no exigency existed to search the container at the time of
arrest, once the container came under the exclusive dominion of the police, the
warrant clause required police to obtain a search warrant.51
Thus, after Chadwick, officers could conduct searches of items found on an
arrestee’s person, so long as the search followed a valid custodial arrest.52 However,
items within an arrestee’s immediate control are not searchable, unless an exigency
existed at the time of arrest to necessitate a warrantless search.53 If no such
exigency exists, “once [police] have reduced luggage or other personal property
not immediately associated with the [arrestee’s person] . . . to their exclusive
control . . . a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.” 54

Personal Laptops Searched Incident to Arrest
While the Diaz court did not mention the search incident to arrest exception
with regard to laptops, it is nevertheless important because it provides assistance
44

Id.

45

Id. at 4–5.

46

Id. at 15.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id. at 15–16.

52

See supra notes 31–41 and accompanying text.

See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15. In a footnote, the Court gave an example of when an
exigency existed that would give police authority to search luggage or other personal property:
53

Of course, there may be other justifications for a warrantless search of luggage taken
from a suspect at the time of his arrest; for example, if officers have reason to believe
that luggage contains some immediately dangerous instrumentality, such as explosives,
it would be foolhardy to transport it to the station house without opening the luggage
and disarming the weapon.
Id. at 15 n.9.
54

Id. at 15.
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in determining whether cell phones are properly searchable incident to arrest.55
Surprisingly, little case law deals with searches of laptops incident to arrest.56 The
vast majority of case law dealing with searches of laptops generally falls into one
of two categories. The first, and most prevalent, deals with searches of laptops
conducted at the border under the border exception to the warrant requirement.57
The second deals with laptop searches conducted pursuant to a search warrant
and issues surrounding the search; for example, whether the search warrant
was overbroad.58
One court, however, has dealt with the search of an arrestee’s laptop incident
to arrest.59 In State v. Washington, the defendant was arrested on suspicion of
auto theft, and the arresting officer “noticed a black bag on the floor [of the
defendant’s car] near [his] feet,” which contained a laptop computer.60 Later, the
arresting officer, believing the laptop to be stolen, directed another officer at the
station, without a warrant, to search its files to determine the lawful owner.61 The
court held that the police had a right to seize the laptop as incident to a lawful
arrest.62 However, “[t]he subsequent search of the computer’s files . . . did not
fall under any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.” 63 The court noted
that although the police had probable cause to believe the laptop was stolen, such
a belief alone did not “authorize [them] to discount [the defendant’s] claim of
ownership and circumvent the warrant requirement” because such a search was
necessarily a “search for evidence to incriminate [him].” 64 Therefore, the court
held, the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of the defendant’s laptop
should have been suppressed.65

55
The majority opinion and the concurrence are devoid of any mention of computers, let
alone laptops. See People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011). The dissent mentions computers only
when using the term “handheld computers” as an interchangeable term for both “mobile phone”
and “smartphones.” Id. at 513–17 (Werdegar & Moreno, JJ., dissenting).

See Mathew E. Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New Frontier of Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 183, 215 (2010) (conceding “[a] search of case
law turns up a paucity of precedent regarding the search of laptops or other computers incident
to arrest”).
56

57
See, e.g., United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Pickett, 598 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Villasenor, 608 F.3d. 467 (9th Cir. 2010).

See, e.g., United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v.
LaFortune, 520 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008); State v. Finesmith, 406 N.J. Super. 510 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2009).
58

59

See generally State v. Washington, 110 Wash. App. 1012 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).

60

Id. at *1.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id. at *3.

65

Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol12/iss2/8

8

Eames: Criminal Procedure - Can You Hear Me Now: Warrantless Cell Phone

2012

Case Note

491

Principal Case
In People v. Diaz, the defendant, Gregory Diaz, drove his passenger to a
location where the passenger sold ecstasy to a police informant.66 Senior Deputy
Sheriff Victor Fazio used a wire on the informant to listen in on the sale.67
Immediately following the sale, Deputy Fazio stopped Diaz’s vehicle and arrested
him for the sale of a controlled substance.68 At the station, an officer seized a
cell phone from Diaz’s person and gave it to Deputy Fazio.69 The cell phone was
entered into evidence along with the other items confiscated from Diaz.70 Later,
Deputy Fazio interviewed Diaz regarding the sale, but Diaz denied that he knew
the sale was going to take place.71 Subsequently—ninety-three minutes after
the initial arrest—Deputy Fazio took Diaz’s cell phone from evidence, opened
the text message folder, and found a message that stated “6 4 80.” 72 Deputy
Fazio interpreted the message to mean “[s]ix pills of Ecstasy for $80,” and Diaz
confessed to participating in the sale when confronted with this information.73
Consequently, Diaz was charged with selling a controlled substance.74

Trial Court and Court of Appeal
Diaz pleaded not guilty and sought to suppress the text message content
from evidence.75 He argued the search was a violation of the Fourth Amendment
because Deputy Fazio failed to obtain a search warrant prior to examining the
contents of his cell phone.76 The trial court denied the motion, noting, because
Diaz was lawfully arrested, a search of his person was warranted, and any evidence
it turned up was “fair game.”77 With the denial of his motion, Diaz withdrew his
66

244 P.3d 501, 502 (Cal. 2011).

67

Id.

68

Id.

Id. The opinion failed to state where the cell phone was located on Diaz, the type of phone
involved, and why Deputy Fazio neglected to seize the cell phone at the time of arrest. See id.
69

70
Id. The other items seized upon arrest were six tabs of ecstasy and a small amount of
marijuana. Id.
71

Id. at 502.

Id. The court noted that Deputy Fazio “had to manipulate the phone and go to several
different screens to access the text message folder. He did not recall whether the cell phone was on
when he picked it up to look through it.” Id. at 502 n.1.
72

Id. at 502–03. Deputy Fazio was able to make such a connection “[b]ased on his training
and experience.” Id.
73

74

Id. at 503.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id. This is the trial court’s exact language:
The defendant was under arrest for a felony charge involving the sale of drugs. His
property was seized from him. Evidence was seized from him . . . . [I]ncident to the
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not guilty plea and pleaded guilty to the transportation of a controlled substance.78
The trial court placed Diaz on probation for three years.79
Thereafter, Diaz appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to the Second
District Court of Appeal for California, which affirmed the decision.80 Relying
on Robinson, the court explained that because the cell phone was “immediately
associated” with Diaz’s person at the time of arrest, it was properly subjected to
a delayed warrantless search.81 The court rejected the argument that cell phones
should be afforded greater constitutional protection because of their ability to
store immense amounts of personal and private information.82 The court noted:
Cell phones may contain personal information, but so do
wallets, purses and the like. The fact that electronic devices are
capable of storing vast amounts of private information does not
give rise to a legitimate heightened expectation of privacy where,
as here, the defendant is subject to a lawful arrest while carrying
the device on his person.83

Majority Opinion
The California Supreme Court began its analysis of the case by considering
whether Diaz’s cell phone was “personal property . . . immediately associated with
[his] person.” 84 If it was, then the subsequent search of its contents was a valid
search incident to arrest as governed by Robinson.85 However, if the cell phone
arrest[,] search of his person and everything that that turned up is really fair game
in terms of being evidence of a crime or instrumentality of a crime or whatever the
theory might be. And under these circumstances I don’t believe there’s authority that
a warrant was required.
Id.
78

Id.

79

Id.

80

See generally People v. Diaz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).

Id. at 218 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974)
(holding “once . . . [an] accused is lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession at
the place of detention that were subject to search at the time and place of his arrest may lawfully be
searched and seized without a warrant even though a substantial period of time has elapsed between
the arrest and subsequent administrative processing”) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 235 (1973) (holding that items immediately associated with the arrestee’s person are subject
to search)).
81

82

Diaz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 217, 218.

83

Id. at 218 (emphasis added).

84

Diaz, 244 P.3d at 505.

Id.; see supra notes 31–41 and accompanying text. The court noted that under Edwards,
414 U.S. at 807, if a search of an arrestee’s effects was valid at the time of arrest, the fact that a search
of those effects did not actually occur until a substantial time after arrest is irrelevant. Id.
85
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was not immediately associated with Diaz’s person, then under Chadwick the
subsequent search was invalid because it was “remote in time [and] place from the
arrest” and “cannot be justified as incident to arrest.” 86
The court adhered to the former, with the majority, in a 5-2 decision, holding
Diaz’s cell phone was analogous to the cigarette package in Robinson.87 Therefore,
under Robinson, the majority concluded Deputy Fazio was free to inspect the
contents of the “container” (i.e., Diaz’s cell phone) that was “immediately
associated with Diaz’s person,” without a search warrant.88 The majority explicitly
declined to consider the immense amount of private, personal information most
cell phones can store.89 In doing so, the court refused to accept the argument
that they should focus on the “character” of the container.90 Instead, the majority
simply ruled because the cell phone was on Diaz’s person at the time of the search,
Deputy Fazio needed “no additional justification” to examine its contents.91 The
majority noted none of the cases it relied on “even hint[] that whether a warrant is
necessary for a search of an item properly seized from an arrestee’s person incident
to a lawful arrest depends in any way on the character of the seized item.” 92
The majority also declined to distinguish between cell phones with low
storage capacity and cell phones with high storage capacity.93 The court opined
that adopting a rule distinguishing between searchable and non-searchable cell
phones, based solely on storage capacity, would be too problematic for officers in
the field requiring “ad hoc determinations.”94 Furthermore, the court noted such
determinations were specifically rejected in Robinson, in favor of a “straightforward,
easily applied, and predictably enforced rule” that allows officers in the field to
search an arrestee and any containers found on his or her person or immediately
associated with it.95
In reaching its conclusion, the majority noted “a delayed warrantless search
of personal property immediately associated with the person of an arrestee at
the time of arrest is justified by the ‘reduced expectations of privacy caused by
the arrest.’”96 In closing, the court noted that if the high court’s decisions are
86

Diaz, 244 P.3d at 505.

87

Id. at 505–06.

88

Id. at 506.

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).

92

Id. at 507.

93

Id. at 508.

94

Id. at 508–09.

95

Id. at 509 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. 218).

96

Id. at 511.
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inapplicable to modern technology, such as cell phones, it is for the high court
alone to re-examine those decisions.97

Dissent
The dissent analogized the cell phone found on Diaz’s person to the footlocker
in Chadwick, rather than the crumpled cigarette package in Robinson.98 The
dissent reasoned that because cell phones can store “immense amounts of private
information,” they should be treated as being in the “arrestee’s immediate control,”
and a court should not justify a delayed warrantless search merely because the
cell phone happened to be located on the arrestee’s person.99 Additionally, the
dissenters asserted that since a cell phone does not pose a safety risk to the officer,
and because most information stored can “be obtained from a defendant’s cellular
provider,” the Chimel justifications for a search incident to arrest are absent.100
Therefore, the dissent concluded that when a cell phone comes under the
“exclusive dominion of the police,” and the arrestee is in custody, police should
be required to seek and obtain a search warrant before searching the arrestee’s
cell phone.101 The dissent reached its conclusion by recognizing that if the court
gives police broad authority to “rummage at leisure” through an arrestee’s cell
phone, it would be allowing “a highly intrusive and unjustified type of search, one
meeting neither the warrant requirement nor the reasonableness requirement of
the Fourth Amendment.”102

Analysis
People v. Diaz represents an unfortunate instance where a court upheld an
unreasonable infringement of a person’s Fourth Amendment right.103 Concededly,
a court is not free to disregard clearly applicable United States Supreme Court
precedent, but attempting to fit a square peg into a round hole to justify the
violation of a person’s Constitutional rights is unacceptable—the Diaz court

97
Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)). In a concurring opinion, the
chief judge noted that “all courts must follow [the high court’s] directly applicable precedents” and
“when there are reasons to anticipate that [the high court] might reconsider . . . a rule of law . . .
[t]he high court has reserved to itself alone the ‘prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’” Id.
at 512–13 (Kennard, Acting C.J., concurring) (citations omitted). Therefore, the court, and the
concurrence, justified side-stepping the real issue that would have been dispositive in the case, which
was whether the rule from Robinson was applicable to modern technology. See id. at 501–13.
98

See id. at 518 (Werdegar & Moreno, JJ., dissenting).

99

Id. at 516, 518.

100

Id. at 514–15 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).

101

Id.

102

Id. at 518.

103

See generally id.
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did exactly that.104 The Diaz majority found the cell phone was “immediately
associated with [Diaz’s] person,” which allowed the court, applying Robinson, to
validate the search of its contents.105 In doing so, the majority perpetuated an
ill-advised practice all too common among courts confronted with the warrantless
search of an arrestee’s cell phone.106 Regrettably, the majority in Diaz failed to take
into account the social context when trying to reconcile the Fourth Amendment
with emerging technologies.107 The social context being that modern cell phones
have the ability to store immense amounts of highly personal information.108
Permitting warrantless searches of any arrestee’s cell phone allows police to
leisurely fumble through the cell phone looking for evidence, without probable
cause or reasonable suspicion that evidence of the crime of arrest will be found.
Such unrestrained authority impermissibly exposes highly private information,
criminal or not, to the eyes of a complete stranger.
This note criticizes the decision reached in Diaz for the following reasons.
First, allowing the search of an arrestee’s cell phone as being incident to arrest
stands in stark contrast to the justifications on which the exception was founded.109
Second, the court upheld the search by analogizing Diaz’s cell phone to the
cigarette package found in Robinson, but should have analogized the cell phone
to the footlocker in Chadwick instead.110 Finally, the court should have examined
the cell phone as if it were a personal laptop and decided the case accordingly.111

See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 348 (2009) (“We have never relied on stare decisis to
justify the continuance of an unconstitutional police practice. And we would be particularly loath
to uphold an unconstitutional result in a case that is so easily distinguished from the decisions that
arguably compel it.”); Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 66–67 (1921)
(“I do not mean, of course, that judges are commissioned to set aside existing rules at pleasure in
favor of any other set of rules which they may hold to be expedient or wise. I mean that when they
are called upon to say how far existing rules are to be extended or restricted, they must let the welfare
of society fix the path, its discretion and its distance.”).
104

105

See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding police
were permitted to search the defendant’s cell phone because it followed a valid custodial arrest);
Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding Robinson allows the
arresting officer to search containers found on a person incident to arrest).
106

107
See Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the
Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 831 (2004) (“Courts generally do not engage in creative
normative inquiries into privacy and technological change when applying the Fourth Amendment
to new technologies. For better or for worse, courts have tended to apply the same property-based
principles to such cases that they have applied elsewhere.”).
108
See infra notes 141–46 (stating that with the storage capability of modern cell phones,
specifically smartphones, a person is able to hold thousands of personal pictures, documents,
contacts, and text messages).
109

See infra notes 112–27 and accompanying text.

110

See infra notes 128–63 and accompanying text.

111

See infra notes 164–72 and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2012

13

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 12 [2012], No. 2, Art. 8

496

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 12

The Exception Swallows the Rule
When the United States Supreme Court outlined the search incident to
arrest exception in Chimel, it did so for two simple reasons: (1) to find weapons
the arrestee might use, or (2) to preserve evidence that may be concealed or
destroyed.112 The Court was seeking to protect officers and ensure their safety and
preserve evidence for trial. In the present context, it is difficult to conceive a cell
phone as being a potential “weapon.”113 Therefore, the only reasonable rationale
to uphold a cell phone search as being incident to arrest would be to preserve
evidence of criminal conduct.
However, this rationale also fails. To begin, Deputy Fazio’s actions following
Diaz’s arrest and seizure of his cell phone exhibited a lack of concern that evidence
was in danger of being lost.114 First, Diaz was arrested and transported to the
station with his cell phone still being left on his person.115 Second, when the
cell phone was finally seized at the station it was immediately put into evidence
without any attempt to preserve evidence.116 Third, it was left in the evidence room
until Deputy Fazio began his questioning and took it out to look for evidence.117
Finally, ninety-three minutes after the initial arrest when Deputy Fazio removed
Diaz’s cell phone from evidence and rummaged through the text message folder,
his sole purpose was investigatory, and not some last-ditch effort to “preserve
evidence.”118 These events plainly show that Deputy Fazio at no time believed
time was of the essence to save valuable evidence.
112
See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 625 (2004) (Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ.,
concurring). Granted, the Court in Robinson went a step further and declared that once a person
has been arrested, the authority to conduct a search is automatic and it is of no consequence whether
the arresting officer actually had reasonable suspicion that the focus of the search (i.e. the arrestee
or a container located on the arrestee) had either weapons or destructible evidence. See supra notes
36–41 and accompanying text. However, this “automatic searchability” rule is clearly inapplicable
in the realm of cell phones because Chadwick, not Robinson, is the far more applicable rule of law
for the reasons to follow. See infra notes 127–62 and accompanying text.

See People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 514 (Cal. 2011) (Werdegar & Moreno, JJ., dissenting)
(observing “there is apparently no ‘app’ that will turn an iPhone or any other mobile phone into an
effective weapon for use against an arresting officer (and if there were, officers would presumably
seek to disarm the phone rather than search its data files)”); Chelsea Oxton, Note, The Search
Incident To Arrest Exception Plays Catch Up: Why Police May No Longer Search Incident To Arrest
Without A Warrant, 43 Creighton L. Rev. 1157, 1209 (2010) (“[C]ell phones pose little, if any,
threat to police officer safety. The mere content of text messages or any other data stored on a cell
phone presents no danger of physical harm to police officers who affect arrests or others. Further,
unlike bags, boxes, and luggage that could hold firearms or other dangerous weapons, cell phones
are incapable of carrying such weapons.”).
113

114

Diaz, 244 P.3d at 502.

115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Id.

118

Id.
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While most information stored on a cell phone could be deleted with a
few strokes of the keypad, such a fact does not justify a warrantless search of an
arrestee’s cell phone for the following reasons. First, most cell phone providers
retain call records for an extended period of time, as well as text-messaging
records, but to a lesser degree.119 Second, when it comes to other information
that could be indicative of criminal conduct stored on a person’s cell phone (i.e.
pictures, emails, video, etc.), once an officer has the exclusive control of the cell
phone sought to be searched and the arrestee is in custody, the destruction of such
evidence becomes extremely difficult.120
There is technology available allowing a consumer to remotely erase data on a
phone.121 Therefore, it could be argued that an exigency does exist, because there
are avenues in which a criminal suspect could wipe the incriminating evidence off
their phone without actually having access to it. But to conduct the remote wipe,
one must log on to an online account and initiate the wipe by sending a wireless
signal to the phone, or contact the cellular provider’s information technology (IT)
department.122 It is hard to believe police would allow an arrestee access to the
Internet, or the chance to call the appropriate IT representative.123
The author sent an e-mail to Verizon Wireless to inquire about the length of time it retains
text messaging records and call records. The following is the response:
119

Text message content is retained for a limited time (up to ten (10) days (240
hours)) from the date or time received at the message center. After that, the message
content is deleted from our message center server and cannot be retrieved. Additionally,
this information can only be obtained via a search warrant.
...
You are able to review call details via your online account for the last 12 months.
E-mail from Verizon Wireless Customer Service, to author (July 29, 2011) (on file with author).
See also Orso, supra note 56, at 198–99 nn.68–69, 71 (noting “the simple fact that an item is a
cellular phone does not alone create a ‘now or never’ situation in which police must act immediately
to preserve evidence of a crime,” because it is consistent practice among several cellular providers,
including Verizon, U.S. Cellular, and T-Mobile, to provide monthly statements of call records, and
it is “standard practice in the industry” to retain text messaging records for roughly two weeks).
120

See infra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.

See Kim Komando, Lost or Stolen Smartphone? Find and Erase it Remotely, USAToday
(Nov. 12, 2009, 8:31 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/kimkomando/2009-11-12lost-smartphones_N.htm (describing the software available to remotely erase data for the iPhone,
Blackberry, Palm Pre, Android, and Windows Mobile).
121

122

See id.

See Mark Sutton, Faraday Bags Help Secure Seized Mobile Devices, ITP.net (Aug. 26, 2011),
http://www.itp.net/585942-faraday-bags-help-secure-seized-mobile-devices. To help alleviate the
concern of data being lost, through either a remote wipe or some other method of data deletion,
there are lightweight and cheap Faraday bags that a cell phone could easily be placed inside. See id.
These bags are “constructed of silver, nickel and copper, which create a Faraday shield, an enclosure
of conductive material which blocks external non-static electric fields such as mobile phone signals.”
Id. Thus, if police departments equipped their officers with such inexpensive bags, the officers could
very easily place the cellular device into these bags, and easily alleviate any concern that the digital
evidence would be remotely wiped.
123
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Even if a remote wipe was somehow conducted, mobile phone forensics, a
subfield of forensics, is dedicated to data recovery and extraction.124 Admittedly,
deleted data overwritten with new data cannot be recovered through such
forensics.125 However, if data were remotely wiped from a cell phone while in
police possession, the only people who have the capability to store new data
are the officers themselves. It is inconceivable that those most interested in the
preservation of evidence would endeavor to create such an obstacle.
In sum, by allowing warrantless searches of an arrestee’s cell phone, the Diaz
court expanded the search incident to arrest exception well beyond its originally
intended scope, allowing the exception to effectively swallow the rule.126 The
rationales that originally supported the search-incident-to-arrest exception from
Chimel are absent from the situation because there is no reasonable fear of a cell
phone being a weapon, nor in losing evidence. Therefore, the arresting officer
should be required to obtain a search warrant before examining the contents,
instead of being granted great latitude in perusing its highly personal information
looking for evidence.127

Why Robinson Cannot Control
A cell phone is not analogous to a cigarette package. To suggest otherwise is to
oversimplify the problem. In Diaz, the majority reached its decision primarily by
finding Diaz’s cell phone to be personal property immediately associated with his
person, and, therefore, subject to search when it was discovered at the station.128
The majority found the cell phone analogous to the crumpled up cigarette
package seized in Robinson because both items were discovered on the arrestee’s
person at the time of arrest.129 It is uncontested that Diaz’s cell phone was found
on his person, which without further scrutiny would put the case squarely within
Robinson.130 However, for the following reasons, Robinson cannot be used to
govern warrantless searches of cell phones.
124
See generally Wayne Jansen & Rick Ayer, Guidelines on Cell Phone Forensics, Nat’l Inst.
Standards and Tech. (May 2007), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-101/
SP800-101.pdf (providing the guidelines that should be followed when conducting mobile
phone forensics).

of

See Mike Bedford, How to Restore Deleted Files and Recover Data from Damaged Disks:
Overwritten Files and Scratched Discs, Techradar.com (Feb. 13, 2010), http://www.techradar.com/
news/computing/how-to-restore-deleted-files-and-recover-data-from-damaged-disks-669475?artc_
pg=3 (“If [a] file has been truly deleted and then overwritten [with new data], the sad news is that
you probably won’t be able to retrieve it.”).
125

126

See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.

127

See supra notes 66–97 and accompanying text.

128

People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505 (Cal. 2011).

129

Id. at 505–06.

See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670
F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting such “is a fair literal reading of . . . Robinson . . . [b]ut . . .
[Robinson] did not reject the possibility of categorical limits to the rule laid down in it”).
130
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The majority in Diaz failed to appreciate five fundamental differences
between a pack of cigarettes and a cell phone. These differences, if properly
considered, should have led the court to conclude that the search incident to
arrest exception, as interpreted in Robinson, does not apply to cell phones. First,
cell phones are not “containers” in the traditional sense; that is, the intangible
character of cell phone data precludes its use as a weapon or capable of holding
evidence that can be physically destroyed. Second, modern cell phones are capable
of accessing almost limitless amounts of data. Third, “cloud” technology means
that to a growing extent cell phone contents are only available by linking wirelessly
to a remote cellular relay tower. Fourth, cell phone searches potentially expose to
public scrutiny almost limitless information of the most private nature. Finally,
the central role of technology in the lives of ordinary Americans heightens the
expectation of privacy owners have in the content of their cell phones. When
viewed as a whole, these characteristics of cellular technology demonstrate that the
application of Robinson to cell phone searches is woefully inadequate to safeguard
precious privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.
First, cell phones are not “containers” in the sense that courts have understood
that term in previous search cases. Since Robinson was decided, the vast majority of
searches that have been found within its holding were searches for tangible evidence
or containers capable of holding tangible objects.131 Examples of “containers” to
which Robinson has been applied include address books,132 purses,133 and wallets.134
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly defined a container
as being “any object capable of holding another object.”135 Cell phone contents
by contrast are limited to digital data, the intangible nature of which renders it
unavailable for use as a weapon or as evidence that can be physically destroyed.

131
See Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets The Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. Rev.
27, 36 (2008) (“For many years, the only evidence found as a result of such searches [incident to
arrest] was tangible physical evidence, such as drugs or illegal weapons.”); Black’s Law Dictionary
1592–93 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “tangible” as “1. Having or possessing physical form . . .
2. Capable of being touched and seen; perceptible to the touch; capable of being possessed or
realized . . . .”); but see generally United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding the
search of a pager incident to arrest, but for reasons to follow a pager is equally incapable of being
analogized to a cell phone).

See United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding “the search of
[defendant’s] wallet and the photocopying of the contents of the address book were permissible as a
search incident to arrest”).
132

133
See Hinkel v. Anchorage, 618 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Alaska 1989) (holding “that [defendant’s]
purse was property immediately associated with her person and, therefore, was properly searched
incident to her arrest”).
134
See generally United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding the “seizure
of defendant’s wallet when he arrived at his initial place of detention following his lawful arrest, the
search of its contents, and the photocopying of documents contained in the wallet”).
135

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981).
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Therefore, the original justifications for the search incident to arrest exception
applicable to containers holding tangible contents cannot logically be applied to
cell phones.
Second, the intangibility of cell phone contents renders modern cell phones
capable of accessing enormous amounts of data.136 When confronted with a cell
phone, the officer who operates it is not merely opening a container in which
other tangible evidence is to be found. Instead, he or she is opening a portal giving
them access to a wealth of intangible data and information.137 For example, one
of the most popular smartphones today is Apple’s iPhone 4, which has access to
32GB of built-in memory.138 In simple terms, that is the equivalent of storing
more than 670,000 document pages, 22,900 photographs, 15,300 MP3 audio
files, or 72 hours of video.139 Moreover, consumers can increase their cell phone’s
built-in memory by up to 32GB of additional data by purchasing expendable
memory sticks.140 The enormous potential for built-in storage alone renders
Robinson woefully inadequate for cell phones.
Third, cloud technology further undermines application of Robinson to cell
phone searches. Cloud computing allows cell phone users “to carry[] out data
storage and processing outside mobile devices.”141 The data are stored in a remote
server rather than on the phone itself and are only accessible by the cell phone
when it communicates with a remote cellular tower. In other words, the cell phone
is “simply [a] terminal[] . . . only intended to provide a more convenient way of
accessing services in the cloud.”142 Thus, the cloud gives cell phone users access to

See Black’s Law Dictionary 879, 1336 (9th ed. 2009) (defining intangible as being
“[s]omething that lacks a physical form . . . .” and intangible property as “[p]roperty that lacks a
physical existence”).
136

137
See supra note 73 (explaining that in the present case, Detective Fazio admitted that he had
to go through several screens before gaining access to the text message folder).

Zach Epstein, Apple’s iPhone 4 Still Top-Selling Smartphone at AT&T, Verizon in September,
BGR.com (Oct. 11, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.bgr.com/2011/10/11/apples-iphone-4-stilltop-selling-smartphone-at-att-verizon-in-september/; iPhone 4S Technical Specifications, Apple,
http://www.apple.com/iphone/specs.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
138

139
Number of Photos, Songs, Documents, and Video Hours a SanDisk Cruzer USB Flash Drive can
Hold, SanDisk, http://kb.sandisk.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/462/~/number-of-photos,-songs,documents,-and-video-hours-a-sandisk-cruzer-usb-flash (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
140
See Sandisk First to Ship 32 Gigabyte MicroSDHC Card, SanDisk (Mar. 22, 2010), http://
www.sandisk.com/about-sandisk/press-room/press-releases/2010/2010-03-22-sandisk-first-toship-32-gigabyte-microsdhc-card (announcing the release of the “world’s highest-capacity removable
memory card for mobile phones,” capable of holding 32GB of additional data).

Xiaopeng Fan et al., A Survey of Mobile Cloud Computing, Biz 2.0 Blog (May 1, 2011,
4:42 PM), http://blog.naver.com/PostView.nhn?blogId=victorikoh&logNo=140128773111
(emphasis added).
141

142

Id. (emphasis added).
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data and information, via an Internet connection, that is not even on their phone.
Therefore, since such information is not even on the cell phone it cannot possibly
be on the user’s person, and thus, Robinson cannot apply.
Fourth, modern cell phone technology creates greater privacy concerns when
compared to traditional “containers.”143 As one court put it, no matter how minor
the offense, the arrestee “is at risk of having [their] most intimate information viewed
by [the] arresting officer.”144 Call logs, text messages, pictures, e-mails, Internet
browsing history, appointment calendars, audio and video recordings, electronic
documents, and user location information are all fair game if Robinson were to
be applied to cell phones.145 Given the fact a cell phone can store vast amounts
of highly private information, as well as give access to even more information
via cloud computing, a person has an extremely high expectation of privacy in
the contents thereof.146 The actual contents might include business trade secrets,
bank account numbers, passwords, entire conversations, or video portrayals of the
most intimate human conduct. In one troubling case, a warrantless police search
revealed sexually explicit photos of the arrestee and his girlfriend.147 An officer
later revealed the materials to others in the police department, merely for their
“viewing enjoyment.”148 Even more troubling, cell phone searches may expose
recordings of the owner’s private thoughts—quite literally giving the police access
to what is inside the owner’s mind.149 In sum, the character of cell phone contents,
coupled with the potential exploitation of highly private information by police,
strongly weighs against application of Robinson in cell phone search cases.
143
See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The potential
invasion of privacy in a search of a cell phone is greater than in a search of a ‘container’ in a
conventional sense . . . .”); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (recognizing cell
phones’ “abilit[ies] to store large amounts of private data gives their users a reasonable and justifiable
expectation of a higher level of privacy in the information they contain”) (emphasis added).

Schlossberg v. Solesbee, No. 10–6014–TC, 2012 WL 141741, at *4 (D. Or. 2012)
(emphasis added).
144

145

See id.

See, e.g., United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008); Schlossberg, 2012 WL
141741 at *4; United States v. Burgard, No. 10-CR-30085 DRH, 2011 WL 353520, at *5 (S.D.
Ill. 2011); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2009); United States
v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Fawdry v. State, 70 So. 3d
626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 461 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011); Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E. 2d 924, 926 (Ga. 2012); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955
(Ohio 2009).
146

Schlossberg, 2012 WL 141741, at *4 (citing Newhard v. Bowers, 649 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444
(W.D. Va. 2009)).
147

148

Id.

See also Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 806 (describing the iPhone application iCam, “[which]
allows [a person] to access [their] home computer’s webcam so that [they] can survey the inside of
[their] home while . . . a thousand miles away. . . . [Thus,] [a]t the touch of a button a cell phone
search becomes a house search, and that is not a search of a ‘container’ in any normal sense of
that word . . .”).
149
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The failure of the court in Diaz to appreciate the characteristics of cell phones
that clearly distinguish them from a pack of cigarettes—the intangibility of
cellular data, the lack of a “container” in which to store weapons or evidence, the
access to boundless data, the emergence of cloud computing, the remote storage
of cellular contents, the highly private nature of the contents, the central role of
cell phones in modern life—reveals a catastrophic flaw in the Diaz court’s logic.
Accordingly, Robinson cannot govern the search of an arrestee’s cell phone. More
specifically, the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement should not be applied to cell phones, and a warrant should
be required for cell phone searches. A primary goal of the Fourth Amendment is
“to curb arbitrary exercises of police power . . . .”150 By allowing police to search
an arrestee’s cell phone simply because it was on one’s person, absent either of the
original justifications of the search incident to arrest exception, is indeed arbitrary.

Why Chadwick Should Control
The situation presented in Diaz is more appropriately controlled by the
considerations presented in Chadwick.151 Diaz’s cell phone, even though found
on his person, should have been characterized as within his immediate control,
thus invalidating the warrantless search that took place ninety-three minutes
later.152 Such a conclusion becomes obvious when one reduces the digital,
intangible items capable of being carried in a cell phone to tangible form. If the
mountain of information contained in a cell phone, especially smartphones, were
instead in tangible form, it would be impossible for any person to carry it “on
their person.” 153 However, such information could potentially be stored in a large
receptacle, such as the 200-pound luggage footlocker in Chadwick, but not directly
on their person.154 A cell phone is far more analogous to Chadwick’s footlocker
because of both objects’ vast storage capacities, rather than to Robinson’s cigarette
package.155 Accordingly, in Chadwick, the Court noted that “once [police] have
reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the
[arrestee’s] person . . . to their exclusive control . . . a search of that property is
150

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

See supra notes 42–54 and accompanying text; see also People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 518
(Cal. 2011) (Werdegar & Moreno, JJ., dissenting).
151

152

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.

153

See infra note 162.

See Schlossberg v. Solesbee, No. 10–6014–TC, 2012 WL 141741, at *3 (D. Or. 2012)
(“In order to carry the same amount of personal information contained in many of today’s electronic
devices in a container, a citizen would have to travel with one or more large suitcases, if not
file cabinets.”).
154

155
See United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(holding that “due to the quantity and quality of information that can be stored on a cellular
phone, a cellular phone should not be characterized as an element of individual’s clothing or person,
but rather as a ‘possession[] within an arrestee’s immediate control [that has] fourth amendment
protection at the station house’”) (citation omitted).
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no longer an incident of the arrest.”156 Thus, once Diaz’s cell phone had been
seized at the station house and placed in evidence, Deputy Fazio should have
been required to procure a search warrant before rummaging through its contents
looking for evidence.
The Diaz majority noted that courts for years have upheld searches, incident
to arrest, of items such as purses,157 pagers,158 wallets,159 and address books160 that
hold information very similar to cell phones.161 However, by allowing searches of
cell phones simply because they can fulfill similar functions is extremely misguided.
With the growing capabilities of cell phones, the amount of highly personal
information capable of being stored dwarfs that which can be stored on any of
the previously mentioned items.162 To allow warrantless searches of modern cell
phones simply because searches of items capable of holding similar information
have been upheld would be unduly overbroad. While cell phones store similar
information such as address books, wallets, etc., the big distinguishing factor is
cell phones are able to hold the information stored in not just one of these items,
but all of them and more.163

156

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977).

157

See supra note 133 and accompanying text.

See United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that “officers [must]
have the authority to immediately ‘search’ or retrieve, incident to a valid arrest, information from
a pager in order to prevent its destruction . . . [b]ecause of the finite nature of a pager’s electronic
memory, incoming pages may destroy currently stored telephone numbers in a pager’s memory”).
158

159

See supra note 132 and accompanying text.

160

See supra note 132 and accompanying text.

161

People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 509 n.10 (Cal. 2011).

See supra notes 8–9. Even basic cell phones have the ability to store hundreds of contacts,
as well as call and text-messaging records. See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 806
(7th Cir. 2012) (“Even the dumbest of modern cell phones gives the user access to large stores of
information.”). Regardless, 33% of American adults currently own a smartphone. Aaron Smith,
Smartphone Adoption and Usage, Pew Internet and Am. Life Project (Jul. 11, 2011), http://
pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Smartphones.aspx. Moreover, smartphone users recently dominated
the number of basic cell phone users. Smartphone Users Became More Dominant than Basic Mobile
Phone Users, TechGeeze (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.techgeeze.com/2012/03/smartphone-usersbecame-more-dominant-than-basic-mobile-phone-users.html. Therefore, it is reasonable to use the
storage capability of a smartphone as the appropriate variable when comparing it to the storage
capability of the above-mentioned items and their contents.
162

See supra note 9; supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text. As previously noted, 32GB
can store more than 670,000 typical Word document pages, 22,900 photographs, 15,300 MP3
audio files, 72 hours of video, or some combination thereof. Supra note 139 and accompanying
text. To properly compare the storage capability of a smartphone to that of items traditionally
searched incident to arrest, one would need a purse capable of holding 1020 compact discs (15,300
MP3 files divided by fifteen tracks), a wallet capable of holding 22,900 pictures, or an address
book capable of holding 670,000 pages of information. See id. Additionally, consumers can use
expendable memory sticks capable of holding upwards of an additional 32GB, potentially doubling
the above comparison. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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Laptops
In addition to the above critiques of the Diaz decision, a more fitting analogy
for cell phones, and more specifically smartphones, is a laptop computer.164 Had
the Diaz court considered such a fit, it would have helped guide the answer to
the question of whether Robinson or Chadwick governed. As the technology
and storage capabilities of modern cell phones continue to grow, they become
increasingly similar to laptop computers.165 Therefore, the Diaz majority should
have taken the applicable authority governing the searches of laptops, as well as
other relevant characteristics, into consideration when it decided the case. The
reason for analogizing an arrestee’s cell phone to a personal laptop, rather than
a cigarette pack, is because laptops generally warrant greater protection under
the Fourth Amendment.166 Consequently, because laptops and cell phones have
grown technologically indistinguishable as they have advanced, they should be
examined similarly.167
As mentioned, courts have had little occasion to confront the issue of laptop
searches incident to arrest.168 Such a fact could reasonably lead one to presume
that such searches are and will be frowned upon by the bench.169 Likewise,
some law enforcement agencies specifically advise their officers to only seize a
person’s laptop and not search its contents because of the uncertainty surrounding

164
See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text (analogizing a cell phone to a laptop helps
counter the argument that cell phones are searchable incident to arrest under Robinson merely
because they are similar in size to a cigarette package).
165

See Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 804 (“[A] modern cell phone is a computer.”).

See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (recognizing that because laptops
“have the ability to transmit large amounts of data in various forms,” they “are entitled to a higher
expectation of privacy”); see also United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1004 (C.D. Cal.
2006) (observing that because laptops can “contain vast amounts of information . . . a search of their
contents [is] substantially more intrusive”).
166

Contra Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955 (stating “cell phones are neither address books nor laptop
computers. They are more intricate and multifunctional than traditional address books, yet they
are still, in essence, phones, and thus they are distinguishable from laptop computers”). The main
distinction between laptops and smartphones used to be the latter’s ability to make phone calls,
but with the growing use of internet video calling technology on personal laptops, the distinction
has grown increasingly blurry. See Orso, supra note 56, at 213 (noting “some people now use
their personal computers and laptops instead of phones, communicating orally through services
like Skype”).
167

168

See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.

See Orso, supra note 56, at 224 (arguing that because “there is a dearth of search incident
to arrest jurisprudence regarding laptops or personal computers, various factors indicate that many
courts would invalidate such searches . . . if the only basis for the search is that it was incident to
arrest . . .”). Therefore, “[f ]or computers and smart phones alike, courts should require that police
obtain a warrant before examining the contents of these devices.” Id.
169
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whether such devices are searchable incident to arrest.170 In sum, the sources that
have considered laptop searches indicate that because a laptop can store immense
amounts of personal information and also send and receive such information in
various forms, it deserves a greater amount of protection from warrantless searches
incident to arrest.171
Therefore, because cell phones are becoming technologically indistinguishable
from laptop computers, they too should be afforded the same amount of
heightened protection.172 Yet the Diaz majority failed to take this into account
when determining whether the search of Diaz’s cell phone was permissible as
incident to arrest. The Diaz majority simply held because cell phones are
“containers” generally found on the person, they are subject to being opened and
searched as decided in Robinson. Conversely, personal laptops cannot be carried
on the person due to their size, and are generally found within an arrestee’s
immediate control, perhaps in some sort of case near the person, or maybe in the
trunk of a person’s car. If the Diaz majority had taken this into consideration, it
would have aided them in determining that Chadwick was the better analogy to
govern the outcome.

Conclusion
The Fourth Amendment was enacted to allow the people “to be secure in their
persons” from the awesome power of the state.173 While there are circumstances
to justify certain warrantless searches, searching an arrestee’s cell phone is simply
not one of them. Since emerging technologies are inherently ever evolving, such
as cell phones, courts should tread with the utmost caution when police concerns
and efficiency are met with such technologies.174 However, the Diaz majority
See Joshua A. Engel, Doctrinal Collapse: Smart Phones Cause Courts to Reconsider Fourth
Amendment Searches of Electronic Devices, 41 U. Mem. L. Rev. 233, 252 n.107 (2010) (stating “an
FBI manual recommends seizing computers and then obtaining a warrant” because “[c]ourts have
not addressed whether electronic media with the vast storage capacity of today’s laptop computers
may be searched incident to arrest”). Additionally, the Tampa Police Department has recognized
that the “seizure of computer equipment . . . is an emerging area of the law,” and has informed its
officers “there are almost no circumstances in which a computer should be examined by seizing
officers,” and officers should “not operate the computer in any way.” Tampa Police Dep’t, Standard
Operating Procedures, Sec. 338: Seizure of Computer Equipment (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.
tampagov.net/dept_police/Files/publications/TPD_SOP.pdf.
170

171

See supra notes 165, 169.

172

See supra note 8.

173

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2012) (Alito, J., & Roberts,
C.J., concurring).
174

In considering the application of unchanging constitutional principles to new and
rapidly evolving technology, this Court should proceed with caution. We should
make every effort to understand the new technology. We should take into account the
possibility that developing technology may have important societal implications that
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failed to so tread the waters.175 Instead it jeopardized California citizens’ rights
by granting the police of California great authority to impermissibly violate a
person’s fundamental right of privacy.176
Absent justifiable rationales for circumventing the Warrant Clause, a court,
responsible for weeding out violations, should not give protection to those who
did the violating.177 Regrettably, due to a lack of understanding of cell phones and
their capabilities, the Diaz majority gave police such protection. The majority in
Diaz should have recognized that the justifications governing searches incident
to arrest were wholly absent from the situation, and accordingly suppressed the
evidence.178 They should have seen that when the intangible contents of a cell
phone are re-conceptualized into tangible form, not even Hercules himself could
have carried them “on his person.”179 Accordingly, they should have recognized that
the only plausible conclusion was that Diaz’s cell phone was within his immediate
control, and the delayed warrantless search was unjustified when Diaz’s cell phone
came under the exclusive control of Deputy Fazio. Consequently, Deputy Fazio
should have been required to obtain a search warrant bolstered by probable cause
and specifying the parameters of the search as decided by a neutral and detached
magistrate.180 The Diaz majority, for the above reasons, failed to properly decide
the case, and in doing so failed the citizens of California.
will become apparent only with time. We should not jump to the conclusion that new
technology is fundamentally the same as some older thing with which we are familiar.
Id.
175

See supra notes 84–97 and accompanying text.

Recently, the California legislature recognized this obvious violation and almost
unanimously passed a bill (102 votes for, 4 against), which would have effectively overturned the
Diaz decision. See 2011 CA S.B. 914 (Sep. 9, 2011). However, the Governor of California vetoed
the bill. See 2011 CA S.B. 914 (Oct. 9, 2011).
176

177
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).

The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions . . . should find
no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the
support of the Constitution, and to which the people of all conditions have a right to
appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.
Id.
178
See supra notes 112–27 and accompanying text; see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339
(2009) (noting that when “both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent”
the exception “does not apply”).
179
180

See supra notes 151–63 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Johnson, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime . . . .

Id.
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